Monday, November 4, 2019

Microprocessor Prosthetic Knee Use for Transfemoral Amputees Essay

Microprocessor Prosthetic Knee Use for Transfemoral Amputees - Essay Example The 19th century saw the use of more advanced lighter-weight prostheses made of wood. It has been found that amputations are largely due to trauma in developing countries while they are from vascular reasons in the developed countries.2 Vascular problems are usually associated with a lot of other illnesses which may limit a person's mobility and hence eliminate the urgent need for an advanced prosthesis. On the contrary, post-trauma amputees are usually younger with more active lifestyles and hence are candidates for advanced prosthetic placements so as to ensure uncompromised quality of life. Conventional mechanically controlled prostheses utilize a pneumatic or hydraulic damper to provide the appropriate gait parameters for the user at his or her conventional normal walking speed.3 The adjustment is usually effected by a prosthetist. When there is a change in walking speed, the pendulum action of the prosthesis for the change in stride or step is compensated by tilting the pelvis or such other physical maneuvers which delay the extension so that the foot is appropriately placed for the next step. These physical negotiations not only mar the flow of the gait but also use up more energy. Mauch Knee4 from Ossur is a nonmicroprocessor-controlle... The basic concept of the microprocessor-controlled lower limb prosthesis is the use of a microprocessor-controlled damper with the help of which step time is measured and knee extension is adjusted to changing walking speeds. The first computer-controlled prosthesis was devised by Blatchford in the early 1990s with a view to improving the amputees' symmetry of gait over a wide a range of walking speeds. The "Intelligent Prosthesis (IP)," as it was called, programs the knee to optimum swing settings for each individual user to achieve the smoothest gait pattern with less energy expense.5 A pneumatic control unit in the knee senses speed changes and adjusts the swinging speed of the prosthesis, making the gait not only look natural but also feel natural for the user. However, the IP works well only on even surfaces. In 1998, Blatchford introduced the more advanced Adaptive Prosthesis. The Adaptive Prosthesis has a microcomputer that adjusts to the change in terrain underfoot and its co mbination of hydraulics and pneumatics assisted weightbearing and responded to changes in the walking speed. The Adaptive Prosthesis provides the required degree of stability for walking, standing and climbing as needed by each individual user. The IP+ of Blatchford offers individually programmed microprocessor cadence control, stance stability to provide a natural gait, and a Stanceflex unit that helps reduce shock during heel strike. The Smart IP of Blatchford, in addition to all of the above features, can be re-programmed at any time by the user for footwear and activity level changes. The Smart IP claims through its studies and trials that with its intelligent pneumatic swing

Saturday, November 2, 2019

Digital economy Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 3000 words

Digital economy - Essay Example With the recent technological boom, electronic businesses and markets have no doubt, flourished. The example of digital entertainment like MP3’s, e-books, availability of various soft wares for download and videos for streaming are only some examples of the phenomenal growth of the digital market. When markets come into play, whether they are digital or physical, price automatically becomes a crucial feature. It is important for consumers because they expect to buy at the least price, it is important for producers because they expect to sell at the highest price while maximizing profits and it is very important for the market as a whole in order to keep resource allocation efficient. One area of interest which scholars have long debated over, in relation to the digital economy, has been with respect to prices. A large amount of literature has been written in evidence of showing the presence/absence of price dispersions in online pricing, the reasons why such a phenomenon occurs and how significant it is in relation to modern retail outlets; traditional, pure-Internet based and multi-channel retail outlets (land based retail presence as well as an internet presence of the retailer). At this point it is important to define the phenomenon of Price dispersion. Pan, Ratchford and Shankar (2004, p.443) define price dispersion as â€Å"the distribution of prices (such as range and standard deviation) of an item with the same measured characteristics across sellers of the item at a given point in time†. In simpler words, it may be defined as the difference of prices among sellers of the same items. This concept has major implications for the retailing outlets as it acts as a cue for assessing their own pricing strategies and is reflective of what strategies their competitors have adopted. Be it the traditional, pure Internet or multi-channel retailer, the degree of price variances among the

Thursday, October 31, 2019

Potential liability Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 250 words

Potential liability - Essay Example Since it was its interest being served at the time of the accident, Mr. Cheatum can claim that it is liable being an employer of its Agentm, Dawn. As to Dawn, she can claim that she was not negligent in her driving. That it was Mr. Cheatum who was at fault. She can claim that she was driving in the prescribed speed limit and was on the right lane and that the accident was due in fact to the negligent act of Mr. Cheatum. As to Fast As We Can Deliver, it can claim that it has exercised diligent in hiring and supervising its employee, Dawn. That the strict liability clause, or the respondeat superior or the vicarious liability clause will not apply to him since at the time of the accident, Dawn has already finished her shift. Hence, she was not at work when the accident happened. As to DNA lab, it should not be held liable since there was no employer-employee relationship between them because Dawn was not an employee of the lab but an employee of FAST. The vicarious liability will not apply to them. "Auto Accident Injury Due to Vicarious Liability". (n.d.) Retrieved from website: http://www.caraccidentattorneys.com/resources/auto-accident/fault-in-car-accidents/vicarious-liability-owner-driver.htm. Accessed on June 14,

Tuesday, October 29, 2019

Discuss the challenges from the introduction and implementation of Essay

Discuss the challenges from the introduction and implementation of information systems in public sector organisations, using two - Essay Example Data warehouses on the other hand give certain personnel the ability to review the operations of people using their data transmitters. The private sector is a sector that has a lot of funds from the fact that the proprietors and the board members of these companies get their capital from their long periods of existence in the various fields. It is important for these people to work hand in hand with public organizations to ensure that they offer their assistance with regard to information and data improvement in the information systems field. These personnel ought to have the qualifications and ethical stature required for this responsibility and with an increase in under-qualified people, civilians feel threatened by the ware houses which is understandable (Ross, 2011, 62). One way through which private enterprises make it far is through their highly efficient and developed data warehouses. Data Warehouses are very important in the running of business. It is important to understand that the private sector can assist the public sector with human resource in this as they have the ability to hire highly educated and experienced technicians with regard to the systems (Bouwman, 2008). Depending on the type of business that one intends to run, there are various sources that the data warehouse can get its data (Brown, 2011, 89). The type of business to major in this case is an alcohol manufacturing company. An example of a source is the Bureau of Labor and Statistics. This is an organization that majors in the identification of the labor market and the various traits that it exhibits. This is with regard to the notion that the area bears with regards to alcohol. Another example is the Census bureau of the location where one identifies the types of people in the area in an effort to recognize the market intended. The type of people in the location might be young mothers and children which definitely offsets any plans of having huge profits in the alcohol industry. The assumptions to be made when introducing such a company is ensuring that the people in the industry are free drinkers and do not have a specific drinking time. This can come in as a vital factor in ensuring that even more sources due to a wider net of information availability. The best decision support applications that can be incorporated in the running of the alcohol business is by cloud computing. There are different kinds of cloud computing and the incorporation of all of them in the company leads to a well established data warehouse. Applications that are cloud based are not easily acquired and thus the importance of getting a security system in the warehouse that can only enable several people to access the cloud (Resich, 2009, 46). The system is complex and yet easy to use. This is from the fact that these web based applications concerning the cloud can be accessed through various simple means. One of these is the use of websites whereby the business owner even at his home, i f he has the expertise and understanding of the security system in the industry can manage to acquire all the information that he needs from the comfort of his workplace office or even at his home. The stated system comes in handy from the fact that the alcohol business has no limits and given the previous assumption that the business is free, people are always busy purchasing alcohol and the cloud

Sunday, October 27, 2019

The Immediate Constituent Analysis In Linguistics English Language Essay

The Immediate Constituent Analysis In Linguistics English Language Essay   Also called IC Analysis,  in linguistics, a system of grammatical analysis that divides sentences into successive layers, or constituents, until, in the final layer, each constituent consists of only a word or meaningful part of a word. (A constituent is any word or construction that enters into some larger construction.) In the sentence The old man ran away, the first division into immediate constituents would be between the old man and ran away. The immediate constituents of the old man are the and old man. At the next level old man is divided into old and man. In grammatical study we are concerned with morphemes and their arrangements but not save in an ancillary way with the phonemic shapes which represent morphemes.Cinsequently in the present sections we shall usually cite examples in their traditional orthography provided the language in question had one and that it involves only the Latin alplhabet.Claddical Greek and Chinese examples are given in well established transl iterations or romanixastions. Genuine phonemic notation will be unused only when advisable for some special redone or for languages like monomania ethic have no traditional orthography. Most modern textbooks of linguistics attach great importance to that is called immediate constituent analysis. The term immediate constituent analysis was introduced by Bloomfield as follows any English speaking person who concerns himself with this matter is sure to tell us that the immediate constituents of poor john ran away there the two forms poor john and ran away that each of these is in turn a complex form that the immediate constituents of ran away are ran and away and that the constituents of poor john are poor and john. We can easily capture through going the given below example. The dog killed the poor cat In this sentence the noun phrases are given but we can easily divide and then make an understand to analysts in immediate constituent that is also one of the important one in linguistic. so there is an obvious parallelism between immediate constituent analysis and the traditional procedure of parsing sentences into subject and predicate and each of these where appropriate into words phrases and clauses jof various types. Bloomfields sentence phrases made up of the now john modified by the adjective poor and whose predicate is a verb phrase consisting of the Vern ran modifies by the adverb away. Underlying both approaches to ;grammatical analysis is the view that sentences are not just linear sequences of elements but are made up of layers of immediate constituents ;watch lower level constituent being part of a higher level constituents can be represented graphically in a number of ways we may use brackets or we may construct a tree diagram. These two methods of representation are equ ivalent. The symbols are employed here merely for convenience jof reference to the diagram the tree diagram given above is to be interpreted as follies the ultimate constituents jof the sentence the elements out of which the sentence is constructed are poor jog ran and away the words poor and gone are the immediate constituents of one construction poor john so the branches leading to them derive directly from one node the words ran and away are the immediate constituents of another contraction being related through the names highway node common to them both and the two constructions poor john and ran away are the immediate constituents of the highest level constriction the sentence itself so they b9oth derive directly from the node it will be observed that neither in the reprewntation of the constituent structure jof the sentence by mend of betray chest nor in the tree diagram have we in corporate the information that poor is an adjectival a that poor john is an noun phrase or of th e notion of ,codification in these respects jour analysis jof the sentences into its constituents differs from ad so far is poorer than the analysis that would be given in terms of the categorizes of traditional grammar. One can distinguish three periods of development in the the airy of constituent structure. L; Bloomfield himself did little mortem than introduce the nn9otion ad explain it by means of examples he spoke of a proper analysis of the sentence into constituents as one which takes accent jof the meanings. his followers notably wells and harries formulated the principles of constituent anal7sis inn greater detail an replaced Bloomfields somewhere vague reference to taking account of the meanings with explicitly distributional criteria. Finally in the last few years the theory loft constituent structure has been formalized and subjected to mathematical study by Chomsky land jot her scholar who have given considerable attention to the nature jof the rules requluired to gene rate sentences dwoth the appropriate constituent structure. There are five kinds of analysis in immediate constituents as follows: 1. Hierarchical Structure 2. Ambiguity 3. Markers 4. Discintious IC 5. Simultaneous IC In the immediate constituent structure five of them given above are seminal things in linguistic so, it is very difficult to analysis of these things without making diagrams so lets to analysis of these things without having an analysis of morphemes as grouping things together in the fight way an analogy who is very keen to make a new kind of solution is so complicate. In our treatment of the general principles of formal grammar in immediate constituents we deliberately adopted the view that all sentences had a simple linear structure that every sentence of the language could be satis Facvtyorilyu described from the grammatical point jof view as a string loft; constituents As a abstract illustration of what is meant by the term string which is the technical term used in mathematical treatments of the grammatical structure of language few may consider thane following instances. 1. Hierarchical structure: The manly on the street is inclined to identify language with words and to think that to study words is to stuufyul; language this view l incorporates two errors. we obviate lone when we realize that morphemes rather than words are unimportant the other error is mow subtle the notion often unstated that we need only examine words as isolated units longer utterances being simply mechanical combinations jof at the smaller units. If lathes were the case then all we would have to learn kin studying a foreign language fowls; be the individual ljmorphemes and their meanings. the meaning jof any whole utterance wools be immediately obvious; jonn the basis of the meanings of the ultimate constituents .Anyone who has lacteally studied a foreign language knows that this is not true. for a striking example loft the falsity loft they assumption we turn to Chinese which is better than French or German jerk Spanish jfodrkl this purpose because ;it differs more drastically from English to any other languages. As leis evidently; some of these English morphemes have meanings which are not easy to describe precisely in English one meets similar trouble in trying rot describe the meanings of some English morphemes inennglishj on general the meanings of morphemes in any one language bias any other language. A careful scrutiny of the meanings of; the seventeen constituent morphemes; of the sentence can at best yield some ague notion of what the whole sentence is about. The meaning of the whole sentence happens be this kind of the matters carries by what he hears. BY virtue of this advance orientation thane active speaker hears the cadence not as a linear string go morphemes but as it were in depth automatically grouping things together in the rightly lay. An; analogy list in order. when we kook at the middle assemblage ;of line segments Jon a either jay on a flat surface the depth that we perceive lies in ;us; not; ;in the figulure.yet our experience in visa perception is such that it ills hard to see as a complicated plane figure rather than I three dimensions the depth which tulle native speakers combination is common and that it carries the rather special partly unpredictable meaning probably likewise have automatically groups together as in fire but in a more complicated ;way if few are to ask that meads he would be pzzled for does not mean anything l;he would probably be unaware that he had heard this particular morpheme sequence inn the sentence and the speaker of the sentence weld scarcely realize that he had said it. All the above is applicable also to fenglish or any other language a meaningless sequence of morphemes like a man are can easily lube found in normal speech. It; occurs; in the dog has killed the poor cat. 2. Makers: We must account for the slanting lines appearing in some of the diagrams. For example, the diagram indicates that the Ics of are the two words in a larger form without being a constituent jof it. Of course a different interpret ratio would be possible but the one we have chosen indicates that and rather than being Joni of the ics of what we may call a structural marker jar signal. some morphemes that is serve leno directly nas carriers of meaning but only as markers of the styrctural relationshjops between other forms.ad marks the fact that something before it ad something after it large the Ics larger grammatical form and ad also marks that a larger form as being of a certain type ;we would choose a similar interpltretration for the markers. 3. Ambiguity: It is possible for a single sequence of segmental morphemes to have two alternative hierarchical organizations; unusually with a difference do; meaning sometimes but in the sentence he was dancing jw3oth the stout major person. We cannot tell whether the mans dancing partner is stout or not. the ambiguity jof its Ic structure is shown in the expression and such ambiguities remind us again jof the analogy with value perception. 4. Discontinuous Ic: Our examples so far have had another property which is common but not nn9oversal forms which belong together as Ic of a larger form have been next to each other in linear sequence .Discontinues constituents are ninety at all uncoil for example in the English sentence the jot her is the discontinuous sequence. But constituents are not at all uncommon framing easy built is parenthesized lotto indicate that it is knot actually spoken there we laved lithe duplication but place a heavy line below the entry and mark with a dotted arrow the section between. 5. Simltaneosly Ic: An intonation morpheme is probably always to be interpreted as one ic of the macro segment which includes the remainder of the macro segment no matter how complex constituting the other. In order to show this diagrammatically we have to introduce another special device, illustrated in their positions of the pills and tic correctly since any alternation in their position mighty yield a different sentence. In grammatical ambiguity we can divide as follows that is also seminal thing in immediate constituent analysis: A) They can fish. B) Beautiful girls dress. C) Some more convincing evidence. Conclusion: Traditional grammar is a family of linguistic theories represented in the grammars written before the advent of scientific linguistics. I use the expression family of theories rather than the word theory, since traditional grammar is not a single, unchanging conceptual object. I assume, however, that it has certain fairly stable defining features. For convenience, I take many of my examples from the Latin grammar of Allen and Greenbush (1931) and the Greek grammar of H. W. Smyth (1916), since both these works are still in print and can be consulted by interested readers.

Friday, October 25, 2019

Focus Essay -- Biology Essays Research Papers

Focus Everyone has problems concentrating once in a while, moments when the words on the page don't seem nearly as interesting as one's own thoughts. Most everyone has days when they feel an unexplained burst of exuberance or restlessness . Maybe it was a promotion or a messy break up, but the work just wouldn't get done and not for lack of trying. Now imagine everyday like this, every day filled with frenetic energy that cannot seem to be channeled into anything productive. Sure it might be fun for a while, but what about when you really need to get something done and it doesn't happen. You go to clean your room, and six hours later there are still piles of clothing on the floor. You can't recall what it is that you've been doing all afternoon. All you know is that nothing got done. You go to read a book, but the words dissolve into marks on the page, patterns which make no logical sense, providing only the background for another means of staring off into space. You go to visit a friend, but she quickly tires of the way you seem to constantly interrupt her. You were listening to what she said, but you just got ahead of her somehow and started talking over her. You find yourself depressed and isolated. This is the world of someone who suffers from Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. (1,2) According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental disorders, published by the American Psychiatric Association as the main set of guidelines for diagnosing mental disorders in the USA, there are four main subtypes of ADHD: inattentive, hyperactive/impulsive, combined, and not otherwise specified. The symptomology of each include: 1. ADHD-Inattentive* : a. Fails to give close attention to details or makes careless mi... ...s not necessarily all bad. By entertaining a greater range of stimuli, ADHD can make the person seem more creative and free thinking. Nevertheless, lacking the ability to properly focus one's attention, the sufferer will also find him or herself at a serious disadvantage on a very fundamental level, which can effect his or her social, scholastic, and emotional life. Thus drug and behavioral therapies are a god-send to many families. Ritalin, as well as Dexedrine and Cylert, etc., should be carefully considered, then carefully monitored if the decision is made to try them. Attention deficit is not an easy thing with which to live, but if found and treated, the person can lead an entirely normal and happy life. Sources Consulted: http://www.mentalhealth.com/drug/p30-r03.html http://www.newideas.net/p0000409.htm http://www.breggin.com/ritalinbkexcerpt.html

Thursday, October 24, 2019

Globalization and Perception on War

Globalization and International Organizations Assignment Submitted By A. S. M. Iqbal Bahar Rana. ID # 103-0007-085 MPPG Programme, North South University Date: 14. 11. 2011 Do you think the advent of information revolution has changed the way war is perceived by the West? If so, what are the implications of such changes for poorly-governed countries of the world? Introduction: The German philosopher Hegel held that revolutions are the locomotive of history. According to his theory, every social, political, and economic system builds up tensions and contradictions over time. Eventually these explode in revolution. One cannot create a revolution in the way that an architect designs a building. Nor is it possible to control revolutions like a conductor leads an orchestra. Revolutions are much too big and complex for that. Those who live in revolutionary times can only make a thousand small decisions and hope that they move history forward in the desired direction. Around the world today we see the growing sophistication and rapid international diffusion of powerful new information technologies, the mergers of huge communication empires, strategic alliances across borders, and the doubling of power and the halving of the price of computing every 18 months (Moore's Law). The Information Revolution, ethno-political conflicts, globalization — each of these three mega-trends is individually important for all nations' future; together, they are redefining the global context within which governments and citizens must make daily decisions in the years to come. Thus, their intersection should constitute a central concern of scholars, policy makers, and citizens. In an era of globalization, national security has a different meaning. Nation-states no longer have a monopoly on the means of coercion. Even if nuclear weapons had a deterrent value during the Cold War, today they have none as the causes of insecurity, more often than not, are economic collapse and internecine conflict, and not external aggression. The information age has revolutionized the instrument of soft power and the opportunities to apply them. The ability of a nation to project the appeal of its ideas, ideology, culture, economic model, and social and political institutions and to take advantage of its international business and telecommunications networks will leverage soft power. In simple terms, the information revolution is increasing inter-connectedness and escalating the pace of change in nearly every dimension of life. This, in turn, shapes the evolution of armed conflict. Whether in economics, politics, or war-fighting, those who are able to grasp the magnitude of this will be the best prepared to deal with it. The use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in warfare scenarios has been of central interest to governments, intelligence agencies, computer scientists and security experts for the past two decades (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1997; Campen and Dearth 1998; Singer 2009). . ICTs gave rise to the latest revolution in military affairs (RMA) by providing new tools and processes of waging war – like network-centric warfare (NCW), and integrated command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). This RMA concerns in the premise of military forces, as they have to deal with â€Å"the 5th dimension of warfare, information, in addition to land, sea, air and space†. Classical Perception of War: Clausewitz is under significant challenge. It is clearly alive and well in the military colleges of Western states but outside these corridors other philosophies are in the ascendancy. A debate continues to rage over the extent to which Clausewitzean thinking is still relevant to today’s wars. From today’s vantage point, several developments have eroded the appeal and power of the political philosophy of war. First, the concept of the battlefield, so central to the way in which Clausewitz understood warfare, has dissolved. The 9/11 attacks, for instance, demonstrated that today’s battlegrounds might be Western (or other) cities while the US-led ‘War on Terror’ – now rebranded as the ‘long war’ – conceives of the battlefield as literally spanning the entire globe. In the future, however, battles are unlikely to be confined to planet Earth as the US in particular will be forced to militarize space in an effort to protect the satellites upon which its communication and information systems depend (Hirst 2002). Second, as the speeches of both Osama bin Laden and US President George W. Bush make clear, the leadership cadres on both sides of the ‘War on Terror’ have often rejected political narratives of warfare. Instead, they have adopted eschatological philosophies in their respective rallying cries for a global jihad and a just war against evildoers where ideology played a significant role in waging war. A third problem for advocates of the political philosophy and one which Clausewitz obviously never encountered is war involving information technology. Information technology brings the Finally, when confronted by ‘revolutionary’ wars which cry out for counterrevolutionary responses, Clausewitz’s injunction to destroy the military forces of the adversary is problematic not just because such ‘military forces’ are often indistinguishable from the local populace but also because one can never be sure they have been eliminated ‘unless one is ready to destroy a large portion of the population’ (Rapoport 1968: 53; see also Chapter 26, this volume). As we have seen, it is fair to say, however, that the political philosophy has been the most prominent in the traditionally Anglo-American-dominated field of security studies (on the ethnocentric tendencies of security studies see Booth 1979, Barkawi and Laffey 2006). All that can be said in general terms is that whatever approach to understanding warfare one chooses to adopt will have consequences, leading the analysis in certain directions and forsaking others. Within International Relations and security studies warfare has commonly been defined in ways that highlight its cultural, legal and political dimensions. Information Revolution and information Warfare: ICTs are used in several combat activities, from cyber attacks to the deployment of robotic weapons and the management of communications among the fighting units. Such a wide spectrum of uses makes it difficult to identify the peculiarities of this phenomenon. Help in respect to this will come from considering in more detail the different uses of ICTs in warfare. An attack on the information system called smurf attack is an implementation of distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. A DDoS is a cyber attack whose aim is to disrupt the functionality of a computer, a network or a website. This form of attack was deployed in 2007 against institutional Estonian websites, and more recently similar attacks have been launched to block the Internet communication in Burma during the 2010 elections. The use of robotic weapons in the battlefield is another way to use ICTs in warfare. It is a growing phenomenon, coming to widespread public notice with US army, which deployed 150 robotic weapons in Iraq’s war in 2004, culminating in 12,000 robots by 2008. Nowadays, several armies around the world are developing and using tele-operated robotic weapons, they have been deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, and more sophisticated machines are being used at the borders between Israel and Palestine in the so-called ‘automatic kill zone’. These robots are trusted to detect the presence of potential enemies and to mediate the action of the human soldiers and hence to fire on potential enemy’s targets when these are within the range patrolled by the robots. Several armies also invested their resources to deploy unmanned vehicles, like the MQ-1 predators, which have then been used to hit ground targets, and to develop unmanned combat air vehicles, which are designed to deliver weapons and can potentially act autonomously, like the EADS Barracuda, and the Northrop Grumman X-47B. One of the latest kinds of robotic weapon – SGR-A1 – has been deployed by South Korea to patrol the border with North Korea. This robot has low-light camera and pattern recognition software to distinguish humans from animals or other objects. It also has a color camera, which can locate a target up to 500 meters, and if necessary, can fire its built-in machine gun. Up until now, robotic weapons were tele-operated by militaries sitting miles away from the combat zone. Human were kept in the loop and were the ones who decided whether to shoot the target and to maneuver the robot on the battlefield. The case of SGR-A1 constitutes quite a novelty, as it has an automatic mode, in which it can open fire on the given target without waiting for the human soldier to validate the operation. Finally, the management of communication among the units of an army has been revolutionized radically by the use of ICTs. Communication is a very important aspect of warfare. It concerns the analysis of the enemy’s resources and strategy and the definition of an army’s own tactics on the battlefield. NCW and C4ISR represent a major revolution in this respect. An example of such revolution is the use of iPhone and Android devices. Today, the US army is testing the use of these devices to access intelligence data, display videos made by drones flying over the battlefields, constantly update maps and information on tactics and strategy, and, generally speaking, gather all the necessary information to overwhelm the enemy. Changing Nature of Conflict: States have been resilient in the face of technological change, and despite the increasingly rapid diffusion of information, states still shape the political space within which information flows (Keohane and Nye 1998; Herrera 2004). Yet state power has been diminished too. States have lost much of their control over monetary and fiscal policies, which are often dictated by global markets (Castells 1996, pp. 245, 254). The rapid movement of currency in and out of countries by currency speculators can extract a devastating cost on countries that do not have large currency reserves. States no longer monopolize scientific research. The Internet allows a global scientific community to exchange information on topics that can be easily exploited by terrorist organizations (Castells 1996, p. 125). The Internet has made it impossible for states, dictatorships as well as democracies, to monopolize the truth (Castells 1996, pp. 384, 486-487). Nor can they monopolize strategic information (Keohane and Nye 1998) – the information that confers great advantage only if competitors do not possess it – because states no longer control encryption technologies. Most critically, IT has made the most technologically advanced and powerful societies by traditional indices the most vulnerable to attack. A distinguishing hallmark of the information age is the â€Å"network,† which exploits the accessibility and availability of information, and computational and communicative speed, to organize and disseminate knowledge cheaply and efficiently (Harknett 2003). The strength of the network lies in its degree of connectivity. Connectivity can increase prosperity and military effectiveness, but it also creates vulnerabilities. Information-intensive military organizations are more vulnerable to information warfare because they are more information-dependent, while an adversary need not be information-dependent to disrupt the information lifeline of high-tech forces. Information-dependent societies are also more vulnerable to the infiltration of computer networks, databases, and the media, and to physical as well as cyber attacks on the very linkages upon which modern societies rely to function: communication, financial transaction, transportation, and energy resource networks. The same forces that have weakened states have empowered non-states. The information revolution has diffused and redistributed power to traditionally weaker actors. Terrorists have access to encryption technologies which increase their anonymity and make it difficult for states to disrupt and dismantle their operations. (Zanini and Edwards 2001, pp. 37-8) Global markets and the Internet make it possible to hire criminals, read about the design and dissemination of weapons of mass destruction, and coordinate international money laundering to finance nefarious activities (Kugler and Frost, eds. 001; Castells 2000, pp. 172, 180-182). Terrorists can now communicate with wider audiences and with each other over greater distances, recruit new members, and diffuse and control their operations more widely and from afar. Non-state actors also have increasing access to offensive information warfare capabilities because of their relative cheapness, accessibility and commercial origins (US GAO 1 996; Office of the Under Secretary for Defense for Acquisition and Technology 1996). Globalization, and the information technologies that undergird it, suggest that a small, well-organized group may be able to create the same havoc that was once the purview of states and large organizations with substantial amounts of resources. The availability off-the-shelf commercial technologies benefits smaller states and non-state actors, to be sure, but only the wealthiest and most powerful states will be able to leverage information technology to launch a â€Å"revolution in military affairs. The ability to gather, sort, process, transfer, and disseminate information over a wide geographic area to produce dominant battle space awareness will be a capability reserved for the most powerful (Keohane and Nye 1998). In this respect, information technology continues trends already underway in the evolution of combat that have enhanced the military effectiveness of states. IT makes conventional combat more accurate, thereby improving the efficiency of high explosive attacks. On the other hand, IT also continues trends in warfare that circumvent traditional military forces and which work in favor of weaker states and non-states. Like strategic bombing and counter-value nuclear targeting, efforts to destroy or punish an adversary by bypassing destruction of his armed forces and directly attacking his society, predate the information technology age. Techniques of information warfare provide attackers with a broader array of tools and an ability to target more precisely and by non-lethal means the lifelines upon which advanced societies rely: power grids, phone systems, transportation networks, and airplane guidance systems. Information is not only a means to boost the effectiveness of lethal technologies, but opens up the possibility of non-lethal attacks that can incapacitate, defeat, deter or coerce an adversary, attacks that can be launched by individuals and private groups in addition to professional militaries. Warfare is no longer an activity exclusively the province of the state. Information is something that states, organized for success in the industrial age, do not have a comparative advantage in exploiting. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt argue that the information revolution is strengthening the network form of organization over hierarchical forms, that non-state actors can organize into networks more easily than traditional hierarchical state actors, and that the master of the network will gain major advantages over hierarchies because hierarchies have a difficult time fighting networks. (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001, pp. 1, 15. ) States are run by large hierarchical organizations with clearly delineated structures and functions. By contrast, a more efficient organizational structure for the knowledge economy is the network of operatives, or â€Å"knowledge workers† not bound by geographic location. This is precisely the type of organizational structure being adopted by terrorist groups as they adapt to the information age. There is evidence that adaptation is quicker in flat hierarchies or matrix organizations than it is in the steep pyramidal hierarchies that run the modern nation-state; that flatter networks have a much shorter learning curve than do hierarchically networked organizations (Areieli 2003). The higher the hierarchy, the faster it operates if it is doing something it has already foreseen and thus for which it is prepared. If, on the other hand, a scenario requires the development of new processes that were not foreseen, the flatter organization is better at learning. Matrix organizations are more creative and innovative. According to Castells, the performance of a network depends on two fundamental attributes: â€Å"its connectedness that is its structural ability to facilitate noise-free communication between its components; its onsistency, that is the extent to which there is sharing of interests between the network’s goals and the goals of its components† (Castells 1996, p. 171). On both criteria, large state bureaucracies suffer serious disadvantages. Informal war: Informal war is armed conflict where at least one of the antagonists is a non-state entity such as an insurgent army or ethnic militia. It is the descendent of what became known as low intens ity conflict in the 1980s. Like today, future informal war will be based on some combination of ethnicity, race, regionalism, economics, personality, and ideology. Often ambitious and unscrupulous leaders will use ethnicity, race, and religion to mobilize support for what is essentially a quest for personal power. The objectives in informal war may be autonomy, separation, outright control of the state, a change of policy, control of resources, or, â€Å"justice† as defined by those who use force. Informal war will grow from the culture of violence which has spread around the world in past decades, flowing from endemic conflict, crime, the drug trade, the proliferation of weapons, and the trivialization of violence through popular culture. In many parts of the world, violence has become routine. Whole generations now see it as normal. In this setting, informal war will remain common, in part because of the declining effectiveness of states. Traditionally, governments could preserve internal order by rewarding regions or groups of society which supported the government, punishing those which did not, and, with wise leadership, preempting conflict and violence through economic development. In a globalized economy, the ability of governments to control and manipulate the economy is diminished, thus taking away one of their prime tools for quelling dissent and rewarding support. In regions where the state was inherently weak, many nations have large areas of territory beyond the control of the government. And, as political, economic, and military factors constrain traditional cross border invasion, proxy aggression has become a more attractive strategic option. Regimes unwilling to suffer the sanctions and opprobrium that results from invading one’s neighbors find that supporting the enemies of one’s neighbors is often overlooked. This is not likely to change in coming decades. Finally, the combination of globalization and the Cold War have fueled the growth of an international arms market at the same time that the international drug traffic and the coalescence of international criminal networks have provided sources of income for insurgents, terrorists, and militias. With enough money, anyone can equip a powerful military force. With a willingness to use crime, nearly anyone can generate enough money. Informal war is not only more common than in the past, but also more strategically significant. This is true, in part, because of the rarity of formal war but also because of interconnectedness. What Martin Libicki calls â€Å"the globalization of perception†Ã¢â‚¬â€the ability of people to know what is happening everywhere—means that obscure conflicts can become headline news. There are no backwaters any more. As suffering is broadcast around the world, calls mount for intervention of one sort or the other. Groups engaged in informal war use personal and technological interconnectedness to publicize their cause, building bridges with a web of organizations and institutions. The Zapatista movement in southern Mexico is a model for this process. The Zapatistas, in conjunction with a plethora of left-leaning Latin Americanists and human rights organizations, used of the Internet to build international support with web pages housed on servers at places like the University of California, Swarthmore, and the University of Texas. This electronic coalition-building was so sophisticated that a group of researchers from the RAND Corporation labeled it â€Å"social netwar. Undoubtedly, more organizations will follow this path, blending the expertise of traditional political movements with the cutting-edge advertising and marketing techniques that the information revolution has spawned. A defining feature of the information revolution is that perception matters as much as tangible things. This will certainly hold for informal warfare. Future strategists will find that crafting an â€Å"image assessment† or â€Å"perception map† of a conflict will be a central part of their planning. In failed states, informal war may be symmetric as militias, brigand bands, and warlord armies fight each other. At other times, it may be asymmetric as state militaries, perhaps with outside assistance, fight against insurgents, militias, brigands, or warlord armies. Future insurgents would need to perform the same functions of defense, support, and the pursuit of victory, but will find new ways to do so. In terms of defense, dispersion is likely to be strategic as well as tactical. There will be few sanctuaries for insurgent headquarters in an era of global linkages, pervasive sensor webs, nd standoff weapons, so astute insurgents will spread their command and control apparatus around the world. Information technology will make this feasible. Right wing anti-government theorists in the United States have already developed a concept they call â€Å"leaderless resistance† in which disassociated terrorists work toward a common goal and become aware of each other’s action s through media publicity. The information revolution will provide the opportunity for â€Å"virtual leadership† of insurgencies which do not choose the anarchical path of â€Å"leaderless resistance. The top leadership might never be in the same physical location. The organization itself is likely to be highly decentralized with specialized nodes for key functions like combat operations, terrorism, fund raising, intelligence, and political warfare. In many cases, insurgent networks will themselves be part of a broader global network unified by opposition to the existing political and economic order. Informal war in the coming decades will not represent a total break with its current variants. It will still entail hands on combat, with noncombatants as pawns and victims. Insurgents, militias, and other organizations which use it will seek ways to raise the costs of conflict for state forces. Gray Area War: As the Cold War ended defense analysts like Max G. Manwaring noted the rising danger from â€Å"gray area phenomena† that combined elements of traditional war-fighting with those of organized crime. Gray area war is likely to increase in strategic significance in the early decades of the 21st century. To an extent, this is a return to historical normalcy after the abnormality of the Cold War. Today, gray area threats are increasing in strategic significance. Information technology, with its tendency to disperse information, shift advantages to flexible, networked organizations, and facilitate the creation of alliances or coalitions, has made gray area enemies more dangerous than in the past. For small or weak countries, the challenge is particularly dire. Not only are their security forces and intelligence communities less proficient, but the potential impact of gray area threats is amplified by the need to attract outside capital. In this era of globalization and interconnectedness, prosperity and stability within a state are contingent on capital inflows. Except in nations that possess one of the very rare high-payoff natural resources like petroleum, capital inflows require stability and security. In places like Colombia, South Africa, Central Asia, and the Caucuses, foreign investment is diminished by criminal activity and the insecurity it spawns. This makes gray area threats a serious security challenge. Gray area war involves an enemy or a network of enemies that seeks primarily profit, but which has political overtones and a substantially greater capability for strategic planning and the conduct of armed conflict than traditional criminal groups. Like future insurgents, future networked gray area enemies may have nodes that are purely political, some political elements that use informal war, and other components that are purely criminal. This greatly complicates the task of security forces that must deal with them. Because gray area enemies fall in between the realm of national security and law enforcement, the security forces that confront them must also be a â€Å"gray† blend of the military and the police. Like the military, security forces must have substantial fire power (both traditional and informational), and the ability to approach problems. But these security forces also must have characteristics of law enforcement, working within legal procedures and respecting legal rights. Even though the objective will be monetary rather than purely political, violence will be goal-oriented. Astrategic gray area war will consist primarily of turf battles between armed gangs or militias. It may be related to refugee movements, ethnic conflict, ecological degradation, or struggles for political power (as in Jamaica in the 1990s, where political parties used street gangs to augment their influence). When astrategic gray area war is linked to struggles for political power, the armed forces (such as they are) will be serving as mercenaries only partially controlled by their paymasters, rather than armed units under the actual command of political authorities. Strategic Information warfare: Formal, informal, and gray area war are all logical extensions of existing types. Technology, though, could force or allow more radical change in the conduct of armed conflict. For instance, information may become an actual weapon rather than simply a tool that supports traditional kinetic weapons. Future war may see attacks via computer viruses, worms, logic bombs, and trojan horses rather than bullets, bombs, and missiles. This is simply the latest version of an idea with recent antecedents in military history. Today strategic information warfare remains simply a concept or theory. The technology to wage it does not exist. Even if it did, strategists cannot be certain strategic information warfare would have the intended psychological effect. Would the destruction of a state’s infrastructure truly cause psychological collapse? Would the failure of banking, commercial, and transportation systems crush the will of a people or steel it? But until infrastructure warfare is proven ineffective, states and non-state actors which have the capacity to attempt it probably will, doing so because it appears potentially effective and less risky than other forms of armed conflict. Future infrastructure war could take two forms. In one version, strategic information attacks would be used to prepare for or support conventional military operations to weaken an enemy’s ability to mobilize or deploy force. The second possible form would be â€Å"stand alone† strategic information warfare. This might take the form of a sustained campaign designed for decisive victory or, more likely, as a series of raids designed to punish or coerce an enemy But should cyber-attacks, whether as part of strategic information warfare or as terrorism, become common, the traditional advantage large and rich states hold in armed conflict might erode. Cyber-attacks require much less expensive equipment than traditional ones. The necessary skills exist in the civilian information technology world. One of the things that made nation-states the most effective organizations for waging industrial age war was the expense of troops, equipment and supplies. Conventional industrial-age war was expensive and wasteful. Only organizations that could mobilize large amounts of money flesh, and material could succeed at it. But if it becomes possible to wage war using a handful of computers with internet connections, a vast array of organizations may choose to join the fray. Non-state organizations could be as effective as states. Private entities might be able to match state armed forces. While substantial movement is underway on the defense of national information infrastructure, offensive information warfare is more controversial. Following the 1999 air campaign against Serbia, there were reports that the United States had used offensive information warfare and thus â€Å"triggered a super-weapon that catapulted the country into a military era that could forever alter the ways of war and the march of history. According to this story, the U. S. military targeted Serbia’s command and control network and telephone system. The Future Battlefield: The information revolution is transforming warfare. No longer will massive dug-in Armies, armadas and Air Forces fight bloody attritional battles. Instead, small highly mobile forces, armed with real time information from satellites and terrestrially deployed battlefield sensors, will strike with lighteni ng speed at unexpected locations. On the battlefield of the future, enemy forces will be, located, tracked and targetted almost instantaneously through the use of: * Sensors and their fusion with a view to presenting an integrated highly reliable intelligence picture in real time. * Surveillance devices that unceasingly seek and shadow the enemy. * Data-links and computer-generated battle picture, task tables and â€Å"maps that change scale and overlay differing types of information in response to voice requests. † * Automated fire control, with first round kill probabilities approaching near certainty. Simulation, visualization and virtually in planning, and testing concepts and weapon effectiveness. This would balance out the need for large forces to overwhelm the opponent physically. Control function will be decentralized and shared at all levels of command. Combat will be in tandem to intelligence gathering. Non-lethal, soft-kill electronic weapons will assume as much importance as highly lethal, hard-kil l weapons. Intelligent command posts and paperless headquarters will be the form. A Commander will be of a different breed-priding more in his lap-top than his baton. He will be his own staff officer. Changing Perception of War and its implications on poorly governed country: The idea that weak states can compromise security — most obviously by providing havens for terrorists but also by incubating organized crime, spurring waves of migrants, and undermining global efforts to control environmental threats and disease — is no longer much contested. –Washington Post, June 9. 2004 A majority of states in the contemporary security environment can be classified as weak. These states exhibit a limited ability to control their own territories because, in part, they do not have a monopoly on the use of force within their borders. They also struggle to provide security or deliver major services to large segments of their populations. These vulnerabilities generate security predicaments that propel weak regimes—both democratic and authoritarian—to act in opportunistic ways. Because they lack conventional capabilities, out of necessity, weak states will have to be opportunistic in their use of the limited instruments they have available for security and survival. The threat of information warfare should be understood within a broad vision of global power that is based on an up-dated version of Mao Zedong’s theory of the ‘Three Worlds’. Just as Mao believed that the world was divided into three tiers of states, with the superpowers at the top, the developed states in the middle and the developing states at the bottom, in the information age is also supposed to be three types of state. At the top of the pile is the ‘information hegemony state’, asserting its control by dominating the telecommunications infrastructure, software development, and by reaping profits from the use of information and the Internet. After this comes the ‘information sovereign state’, exemplified by those European states that have accumulated sufficient know-how to exert independent control over their information resources and derive profits from them, and to protect themselves from information hegemony. At the bottom of the pile are the ‘information colonial and semi-colonial states’, which have no choice but to accept the information that is forced on them by other states. They are thus left vulnerable to exploitation because they lack the means to protect themselves from hegemonic power. In recent years, the nature of conflict has changed. Through asymmetric warfare radical groups and weak state actors are using unexpected means to deal stunning blows to more powerful opponents in the West. From terrorism to information warfare, the Wests air power, sea power and land power are open to attack from clever, but much weaker, enemies. The significance of asymmetric warfare, in both civilian and military realms become such an important subject for study to provide answers to key questions, such as how weaker opponents apply asymmetric techniques against the Western world, and shows how the West military superiority can be seriously undermined by asymmetric threats. Conclusion: It is said that nothing is permanent except change. This is particularly true in the information age. It is important to understand the nature of the new world information order in order to be effective in foreign policy initiatives and to conduct the international relations. The information revolution throws up various contradictory phenomena. It includes the strengthening of the forces of anarchy and control. The revolution empowers individuals and elites. It breaks down hierarchies and creates new power structures. It offers more choices and too many choices, greater insight and more fog. It reduces the risk to soldiers in warfare and vastly increases the cost of conflict. It can lead to supremacy of the possessors of information technologies while it leads to vulnerabilities to the same possessors from weaker nations. It cedes some state authority to markets, to transnational entities and to non-state actors and as a result produces political forces calling for the strengthening of the state. However, a mere look at some of the manifestations of the arrival of information technology in international relations, clearly brings out how the nature and exercise of power have been permanently altered. Benjamin Barber describes a world that is both coming together and falling apart in his book Jihad Against McWorld. He describes a world where the nation state is losing its influence and where the world is returning to tribalism, regionalism, and the ethnocentric warfare that characterized much of the earlier human history. This problem is most apparent in the developing world where we continue to see the spread of disease, continuing humanitarian crisis, political and economic instability, and ethnic, tribal, civil, and drug related war. There are several themes that are consistent across these global futures. The first is conflict. The negative effects of globalization will continue to promote regionalism, tribalism, and conflict in the developing world. Secondly, nations with uncontrollable population growth, a scarcity of natural resources, and poor government systems will fail to benefit from globalization regardless of its effects on the rest of the world. Thirdly, technology will continue to be exploited to benefit developed nations and illicit criminal/terrorist networks, and will have little affect on the developing world. In all scenarios the power of the state will weaken and the power of the non-state networked actor will continue to expand with the help of the tools of globalization. References: Paul D. Williams. (2008). War. In: Paul D. Williams Security Studies: An Introduction. New York: Routledge. p151-p171. Akshay Joshi. (2010). The Information Revolution and National Power:Political Aspects-II. Available: www. idsa. org. Last accessed 13rd November 2011. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. , â€Å"Power and Interdependence in the Information Age,† Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 5, September/October 1998. Steven Metz. (2010). ARMED CONFLICT IN THE 21st CENTURY:. Strategic Studies Institute. 01 (1), 65-119. Arquilla, J. (1998). Can information warfare ever be just? Ethics and Information Technology, 1(3), 203-212. Floridi, L. (2009). The information Society and Its Philosophy. The Information Society, 25(3), 153-158. Steven, Doglous, 2002. Information Warfare: a Philosophical Perspective. 1. London: University of Hertfordshire. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr.. (1998). Power and Interdependence in the Information Age. Foreign Affairs. v. 77 (5), 1-10 David J. Rothkopf, â€Å"Cyberpolitik: The Changing Nature of Power in the Information Age†, Journal of International Affairs, Spring 1998, p. 27. Akshay Joshi, â€Å"The Information Revolution and National Power: Political Aspects-I†, Strategic Analysis, August 1999. Jessica Mathews, â€Å"Powershift†, Foreign Affairs, January/February 1997, pp. 50-55. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976). The seminal discussion of the political philosophy of war. Emily O. Goldman and Leo J. Blanken, 2011, THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF MILITARY POWER, California, University of California-Davis